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ONE OR TWO NEGATIONS IN PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL LANGUAGE?
by Rob Wiche
SUMMARY
The purpose of this enquiry is to investigate by means of a number of historical and
systematic case studies the way in which a distinction is made in philosophy andlor
natural language between extemal and internal negations and the extent to which such
distinctions can be maintained and, eventually, be formalised.
Central to this investigation are the following three questions:
1. Are several kinds of negation distinguished to explain phenomena of natural
language'l
2. In what way can we speak under 1. of several kinds of negation? Is the distinction
a syntactic, a semantic, an inferential or a pragmatic distinction?
3. Must several kinds of negation be distinguished in order to explain the phenomena
mentioned under l. and 2.? Cannot we be satisfied with one kind?
Question one is dealt with in chapters 2, 3, 4,5, 6 and 8. Chapter I offers the elements to
answer question 2, while question 3 will be dealt with in chapters 6 and 7.
Chapter I discusses four ways to characterise negation: a semantic, a syntactic, an
inferential and a pragmatic way.
Chapter 2 is dedicated to answering the question whether we can speak with Aristotle of
two kinds of negation or only of one. For this purpose 'Analytica Priora', book 1, chapter
46, is analysed. The result of this analysis is compared to the picture given by Aristotle's
non-modal logic (non-modal syllogistic). In this connection Aristotle's distinction between
contradictory, contrary, privative and relative opposition will be dealt with. In order to
bridge to some degree the gap between Aristotle's negation theories and Kant's (see
chapter 3) I will deal in 2.5. with the negation theory of the l3th-century philosopher
Petrus Hispanus.
Horn's claim that Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of negation should be
qualified. Aristotle envisages sentences with negative terms; and in his 'Analytica Priora,
l, 46' can be recognized two kinds of negation. But in his non-modal syllogistics the term
negation hardly plays a role.
Aristotle distinguishes on logical grounds between conÍary and contradictory oppositon
even when singular sentences are concerned. This distinction could be a motive for the
introduction of two kinds of negation. Outside Aristotle's 'Analytica Priora I,46' nothing
of such a motive can be found back.
In chapter 3 I shall deal with various aspects of Kant's negation theory. For instance I will
discuss the various kinds of opposition that are present in Kant. Kant's most important
distinction in this respect is the one between dialectical and analytical opposition. This
distinction is connected with Kant's so-called antinomies. Furthermore Kant's distinction
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between afffirrnative, negative and infinite judgements will be dealt with. Finally Kant's
understanding of contradiction will be cornpared to that of Aristotle.
Beside sorne six differences between Aristotle's theories of negation and Kant's there is
one important sirnilarity: the arnbivalent attitude they have with regard to negation. Both
philosophers seerÍr to put fbrth arguments for the distinction of two kinds of negation,
althou-sh these arguments are not very convincing. As far as this ambivalence is
concerned, Kant can be just i f iedly cal led a pupi l  of Aristot le.
Ayer thinks that the distinctions between affirmations and negations are absolutely not
rnaintainable. Griss pleas for the elimination of negation frorn constructive (intuitionistic)
rnathematics. Lastly, Frege thinks that the distinction between affirmations and negations
should be withdrawn, unti l  one has found a mark on which such a dist inct ion can be made
in every case. These claims are discussed in chapter 4. The rnost important conclusion is
that it is not a very successful enterprise to trying to drive negation frorn natural language.
In chapter -5 Frege's dist inct ion between iudgement-negation and proposit ional negation
and Searle's between i l locutionary and proposit ional negation is dealt with.
Several authors, as chapter 6 shows, make a distinction between two pragmatic functions
of denials. Sigwart considers the denial (negation) that has a basis in a lack, as opposed to
the denial that rests on a contradict ion. Mannoury dist inguishes between choice-negation
and exclusion-negation, Blau between strong and weak negation, Seuren between rninimal
(presupposing) and radical (non-presupposing) denial, Reinach between ordinary and
polernic negation. A further function of denial is that of discrepancy negation, that is
present in arnongst others Husserl, Sartre, Wason and Johnson-Laird and Vandamrne. Four
formal systerns, that possibly can serve as formalisation of Mannoury's negation theory
are presented in chapter 6: the three-valued systerns of Blau, Kleene, t ukasiewicz and
Bochvar. Of these systems Blau's is the most adequate.
The functions of exclusion-negation, discrepancy-negation and choice-negation discussed
in chapter 6 do not cover al l  cases: Kant's inf ini te judgements (chapter 3), Reinach's
ordinary negative judgements, Seuren's rninimal (presupposing) negation and Blau's strong
(assert ing, presupposing) negation cannot be brought under those functions. I  cal l  these
negations rninimurn-negations in a naÍrow sense (see the schematic view in 6.9.).
Horn's dist inct ion between truth-functional (descript ive, logical) and rnetal inguist ic (non-
descriptive, non-logical) negation is treated in chapter 7. The negations discussed in
chapter 6 al l  belong to what Horn cal ls descript ive negations. I  deal especial ly with the
question whether or not one negation-operator is sufficient. I do this with the help of the
predicate-logical system of the'event logic' ,  thereby making a dist inct ion between init ial
and derived representations of negations. With the initial representation, knowledge of the
context or background knowledge plays no role whatsoever. This conflicts with the case of
derived representations. There is just one initial representation. However, more derived
representations can be distinguished.
Forrnally de operator '-KORR' is sufficient for all negations. If on the basis of the context
and/or background knowledge we already know that 'NEGcr' is a metalinguistic negation,
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we may symbolise 'NEGct' as '-ADo'. If, on the contrary, we know or suspect that
'NEGct' is a descriptive negation, we may choose '-o' as initial representation. The meta-
linguistic negation is a non-truth-functional negation. On the contrary all descriptive
negations are truth-functional. The operator '-KORR' is semi-truth functional. It is a
disjunction of the truth-functional part '-cr,' and the non-ffuth-functional part '-ADa'. The
differences between the various descriptive negations conceÍn exclusively the derived
representations.
Sentences with non-eliminable, morphologically incorporated negations are preferably
considered as affirmations.
For the forrnulation of differences in opinion, exclusion-negation seems to be most
adequate (see chapter 6 and 7). But is it the only kind of negation prevailing in
discussion? This question will be answered in chapter 8. The subjects relevant here are:
questions and negation, stressing and negation, non-competitive versus competitive
negations, minimal, intuitionistic (constructive) or classical negation, negative propositions
versus negative points of view. The subjects all have to do with the question whether or
not two negations have to be distinguished in discussion.
In my opinion those negations that serve primarily to express differences in opinion
deserve the predicate 'competitive'. Exclusion-negations, choice- and metalinguistic
negations above all can be considered competitive negations. Minimum-negations in a
narrow sense and discrepancy-negations on the contrary seem to be non-competit ive
negations. It is not necessary to adduce a further negation operator (for non-competitive
negation) for non-competitive fragments of discussions. The distinction between these
fragments is that in non-competitive fragments it does not matter which logical system
(minimal-logical, intuitionistic or classical) is chosen, but this choice does matter in a
competitive fragment.
Aristotle's distinction between two kinds of negation in 'Analytica Priora I,46' can be
characterised as inferential (see the relations between't#Gl(x)'and'-G(x)', as they are
expressed in the sentences (2) to (8) in 2.2.). This distinction may also be formally
reconstructed as a syntactic distinction (see 2.3.).
Kant's characterisations from 3.6. aÍe rather vague: too vague anyway to answer with
success the question of what nature these characterisations are.
Searle's and Von Wright's distinctions are of an inferential nature. Von Wright's
distinctions, however, can also be characterised as semantical distinctions (see 1.1.).
Mannoury's distinction (6.2.3.) is pragmatic, but can also be reconstructed as a semantic
distinction, preferably with the help of Blau's system (6.7.1.). Horn's distinction can be
characterised as an inferential distinction with the aid of the formula '-KORRa =
ADcr v -o'. The definition of discrepancy negation (Def. 6.3.) is a pragmatic
characterisation. The relation between discrepancy-negation and exclusion-negation is
furthermore of an inferential nature. The latter follows from the former, but not the other
way around. The distinction between non-competitive and competitive negation can in any
case be characterised in pragmatic terms. The same goes for Keijsper's (and Carlson's)
two kinds of stressed nesations.
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